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Miss - 6

DD/ST# 31/3/65

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, ADP Committee

THROUGH : DD/S&T

SUBJECT : Response to Action Memorandum A-444.

I am returning the report of the ADP Committee with a request that the Committee return to work to answer the questions posed in the action memorandum. I commend to your attention the dissenting viewpoint of the DD/S&T as expressed by [] I wish that these viewpoints would be considered without prejudicing your final report. I believe that the ADP Committee should present to the DCI more positive recommendations and a clearer plan for the future of our ADP system. I would like to have this report in the hands of the Executive Director by September 15. I am giving this late deadline because I am certain that the work on the long range plan will definitely affect the revised report.

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Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

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cc: DD/S
D/BPAM
C/COMOR

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Comments on ADP Committee Report

1. The report does not address itself to the first issue raised in paragraph 3a of Action Memorandum A-444, i.e., "projection of probable Agency automatic data processing needs over the next five years in the light of anticipated intelligence programs and ADP equipment advances". In fact no mention is made of any Directorate's intelligence program for the next five years; also, ADP equipment advances and possible utilization are completely ignored. I have no idea of what can be expected in the way of new equipment five years from now.
2. Naturally, since major needs are not discussed alternatives to these needs are not discussed except for current estimated costs and manpower. No figures are introduced at all.
3. "Further economies" in the use of ADP assets are not discussed.
4. The Clewlow report contains 4 specific recommendations on:
 - a. Establishment of an ADP Classification system,
 - b. Development of a criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of ADP systems,
 - c. Development of master data processing plans at appropriate agency levels and,
 - d. Development and application of ADP cost principles.

These four areas are passed over in the report and alluded to at best.

5. The report does not bridge the gap between the cost, effectiveness, and capability of equipment now in use and future equipment. As a matter of fact, it doesn't positively state that we can't get along with what we now have five years from now.
6. The report concerns itself with organization rather than equipment capability, cost and effectiveness. I suppose indirectly, the report says that if ADP management were lodged in the O/DCI, then they could better respond to Executive Directives on the subject. But, this is the only logical reason advanced for placing ADP in the O/DCI as I see it.

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7. On page 17 the report makes an "educated(?) guess" regarding personnel strength and cost in 1970 but gives no breakdown of costs either by equipment or by Directorate.
8. Throughout, it seems to me that the Committee is trying to justify the existence of each of the ADP components. Kirk isn't asking them to defend themselves by their past accomplishments, he's asking them where they expect to be in 1970. Witness the last sentence on page 23 and which continues over to page 24.
9. I question the "comment" on page 24 in paragraph 2a viz:

"No viable mechanism exists in CIA with the clear mission to develop policy, coordinate planning, or otherwise monitor Agency-wide ADP activities."

By regulation, the means to create this mechanism has been given to the AD/OCS.
10. I question the comment in paragraph 2b for these same reasons. The problem it seems lies in the fact that the AD/OCS has not seen fit to use the regulation in the past.
11. In paragraphs C1 and 2 on page 28, I ask why "the Committee dealt primarily with the problem of organization and the assignment of ADP roles" and not "security problems" and "advanced ADP technology" inasmuch as this is what they were tasked to look into. In paragraph C2 there is an assumption that ADP "is certain to expand" and there is no reason given for the assumption.
12. I would demand a technical explanation of the statement on page 30 to wit:

". . . "on-line" applications involving complex interplay between manual and computer based referenced facilities, as well as certain developmental activities, and certain highly sensitive applications, can most effectively be managed under complete Directorate control."

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13. On page 31, the report spends considerable time on the difficulty encountered in trying to establish acceptable definitions of ADP Center, Mission oriented center, etc., and then concludes that since they could not decide on a definition "the Committee was unable to obtain unqualified acceptance of a premise that the preservation of the status quo represents a condition or set of conditions which should or should not continue indefinitely to be tolerated." This is mixing apples and bananas.
14. In paragraph 4 on page 32, the Committee states that "the validity of settling on any one course is suspect because criteria to measure effectiveness of mission accomplishment and security considerations in balance against cost of one or another of the several possible alternatives have not been established to everyone's satisfaction". I submit that this is not the issue here. The issue simply stated is: "What we expect to have in the way of new equipment and people over the next five-year period to support the Agency's intelligence program? How much will it cost? Will our ADP be administered in accordance with Executive Directives?"
15. There's an assumption that if the management of the Agency's ADP activity were placed in the O/DCI, that it would operate more effectively. This is not necessarily a valid assumption.
16. On page 2 of Attachment A "Suggested list of functions for the Assistant for Data Processing", the Committee suggests that power be given to "review and recommend the establishment of new computer centers if justified and conversely the dissolution of old centers . . ." If adopted, this authority could conceivably result in one centralized center.

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Comments on [] Rebuttal

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1. The only significant comment I have here is:

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In one respect [] has produced some self-serving figures. On page 6 he estimates that all Headquarters Building computing can be done on the Mod 67 system within a single shift, yet when he presents his figures in Table 2 - as arguments against decentralization - he is using two shifts.

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2. Otherwise, [] presents a sound argument and confines himself to the issues raised in the Action Memorandum A-444.

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